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Redevelopment in the Golden State:
A Study in Plenary Power Under the
California Constitution
by DANIEL S. MAROON*
Introduction
On January 20, 2011, California Governor Jerry Brown issued a
proclamation reaffirming the fiscal emergency that had been declared
by his predecessor administration.' In response to the fiscal
emergency, the State Legislature enacted two measures that were
intended to stabilize school funding by reducing or eliminating the
diversion of property tax revenues from school districts to the State's
community redevelopment agencies. Assembly Bill 26 of the First
Extraordinary Session of 2011 ("A.B. 26") prohibits redevelopment
agencies from engaging in new business and sets out a path for their
windup and dissolution! Assembly Bill 27 of the First Extraordinary
Session of 2011 ("A.B. 27") gave redevelopment agencies an
alternative: the agencies could continue to operate if the cities and
counties that created them would agree to make payments into funds
benefiting the State's schools and other special districts.' The
California Redevelopment Association, the League of California
Cities, and other affected parties immediately brought suit, seeking
direct relief from the Supreme Court of California on grounds that
the statutes violated various portions of the California Constitution.
In what has been described as a "watershed event for cities" in
California, the Supreme Court of California unanimously affirmed
* Juris Doctor Candidate 2013, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law. I would like to thank Professor Darien Shanske for his guidance through this
project. Of course, all errors are my own.
1. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Fiscal Emergency Proclamation by the Governor of the
State of California, OFFICE OF GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN JR. (Jan. 20, 2011),
http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=16882.
2. A.B. 26, 2011 Assem., 1st Ext. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
3. A.B. 27, 2011 Assem., 1st Ext. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
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the constitutionality of A.B. 26, which eliminated redevelopment
agencies altogether.! Additionally, and to the surprise of the
agencies' backers, the court invalidated A.B. 27, which offered the
agencies a route to survival.
This Note analyzes the constitutional significance of California
Redevelopment Association v. Matosantos.' Part I contextualizes the
dispute by setting out a brief history of redevelopment in California.
Part II discusses the court's unanimous opinion in addition to Chief
Justice Cantil-Sakauye's concurring and dissenting opinion. Part III
evaluates what future redevelopment may look like in the wake of the
Matosantos litigation. Specifically, I consider what avenues advocates
for redevelopment may take that are consistent with the Matosantos
court's constitutional conclusions.
I. Redevelopment in California
Redevelopment legislation was born, in California and
elsewhere, as a response to the decay that inner cities began to suffer
in the years following World War II. Due in large part to suburban
sprawl becoming North America's dominant pattern of urban growth,
the inner cores of cities across the country lost residents and the tax
revenues that they generated.! Reacting to this development, a City
of Los Angeles Town Hall Report remarked in 1944 that "[t]he decay
of large areas in American cities ... is one of the major problems of
today. Blight and slums have spread over an estimated one-fourth of
the urban America."' As soldiers returned home during the postwar
years, public officials worried about the condition of existing housing
resources, the lack of affordable housing, and persistent urban blight.9
In order to help local governments revitalize their blighted
communities, the California Legislature enacted the Community
Redevelopment Act in 1945.o In 1951, the Community
Redevelopment Act was codified and renamed the Community
4. Maura Dolan et al., California High Court Puts Redevelopment Agencies Out of
Business, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/29/local/la-me-
redevelopment-20111230
5. Cal. Redevelopment Ass'n v. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th 231 (2011).
6. Id.
7. ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE
DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 4 (2000).
8. JOSEPH E. COOMES, JR. ET AL., REDEVELOPMENT IN CALIFORNIA 1 (4th ed.
2009).
9. Id.
10. Id.
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Redevelopment Law." Significantly, the mechanism for tax-
increment financing was added at this point, although it did not have
effect until California voters in 1952 approved an amendment that
added Article XIII, Section 19 to the California Constitution.12
Tax-increment financing is the most widely used tool for
financing urban redevelopment in the United States. It has been
authorized in forty-nine states and the District of Columbia and
continues to be implemented in every type of community." It has
been described as "the first tool that local governments pull out of
their economic development toolbox." 4 Under tax increment
financing, "revenue growth generated within a geographically defined
area is earmarked for a period of years to fund physical infrastructure
and other expenditures designed to spur economic growth within that
district."" In other words, property tax revenues for entities other
than the redevelopment agency are frozen, while revenue from
increased value is returned to the redevelopment agency on the
assumption that the increased value is due to the redevelopment.'6 In
theory, this finance structure becomes self-financing as the
incremental revenues that are generated are used to pay for the
program that spurred the growth.
Although it was authorized in 1952, tax-increment financing was
not relied upon as a principal source of finance in California until the
1960s. By 1984, there were at least 273 redevelopment agencies
operating within California that were funding projects with tax
increment financing." Because they generally could not levy taxes,
11. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33000 et seq. (West 2012)
12. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 16.
13. See COUNCIL OF DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AGENCIES AND INTERNATIONAL
COUNCIL OF SHOPPING CENTERS, TAX INCREMENT FINANCE: BEST PRACTICES
REFERENCE GUIDE 1 (2007), available at http://www.cdfa.net/cdfa/cdfaweb.nsf/pages/
documentpage.html/$file/CDFATIFRefGuide2007.pdf.
14. James Krohe, Jr., At the Tipping Point Has Tax Increment Financing Become
Too Much of a Good Thing?, PLANNING 20,21 (March 2007).
15. Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the
Political Economy of Local Government, 77 CHI. L. REV. 65, 66 (2010).
16. See City of Cerritos v. Cerritos Taxpayers Ass'n., 183 Cal. App. 4th 1417, 1424
(2010).
17. CALIFORNIA DEBT ADVISORY COMMISSION, THE USE OF REDEVELOPMENT
AND TAX INCREMENT FINANCING BY CITIES AND COUNTIES 28 (1984),
http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/reports/redevelopment.pdf.
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California redevelopment agencies relied on tax increment financing
to fund nearly all of their projects.
Redevelopment agencies were typically governed by their parent
community's legislative body.'9 Agencies were authorized by statute
to "prepare and carry out plans for improvement, rehabilitation, and
redevelopment of blighted areas."20 In order to carry out their
redevelopment plans, agencies were given the authority to acquire
real property," including through eminent domain,22 to dispose of that
property by sale or lease without conducting a public bidding,23 to
clear land and construct the infrastructure necessary for building on
project sites," and to make improvements to other public facilities
within the project area." One way that California redevelopment
agencies could undertake a project was to buy parcels of land,
improve the land's infrastructure, and then transfer the land to
private developers for residential or commercial development.
Although a flexible and powerful tool for driving economic
development, tax increment financing has been controversial in
California for some time. Courts have observed that it has
"sometimes been misused to subsidize a city's economic development
through the diversion of property tax revenues from other taxing
entities."" This practice became more common as local governments
felt their tax revenue constrict in the years following the 1978 passage
of Proposition 13. Small cities with blighted areas "were able to
shield virtually all of their property tax revenue from other
governmental agencies."' Because Proposition 13 limited increases
on property tax rates, it "created a kind of shell game among local
government agencies for property tax funds [and] [t]he only way to
18. See Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Martin, 38 Cal. 3d 100, 106
(1985).
19. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33200 (West 2012).
20. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33131(a) (West 2012).
21. Id. at § 33391(a)
22. Id. at § 33391(b).
23. Id. at §§ 33430-31.
24. Id. at §§ 33420-21.
25. Id. at § 33445.
26. See, e.g., Marek v. Napa Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 46 Cal. 3d 1070, 1075
(1988).
27. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency v. Dibley, 20 Cal. App. 4th 1656, 1658 (1993).
28. WILLIAM FULTON & PAUL SHIGLEY, GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA PLANNING 263-
64 (3d ed. 2005).
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obtain more funds was to take them from another agency."29 Others
have worried that, when coupled with the power of eminent domain,
tax increment financing incentivized violations of property rights for
nonpublic uses.'
As part of an effort to address these concerns, the California
Legislature required redevelopment agencies to transfer certain
amounts of their tax increment revenue to other local entities that
needed funds. For example, in 1976 the Legislature required that a
full twenty percent of the tax increment revenue generally must be set
aside in a fund for provision of low and moderate-income housing."
Additionally, redevelopment agencies were required to make a
graduated series of "pass-through" payments to local government
taxing agencies like cities, counties, and school districts from tax
increment-funded projects initiated or expanded after 1994.32
Perhaps most significantly, the Legislature often required
redevelopment agencies to make contributions to educational
revenue augmentation funds ("ERAFs") for the benefit of school and
community college districts.3 ' These payments are the results of
protracted controversy over the financial advantage that tax
increment financing gave redevelopment agencies over other local
taxing entities, like school districts. Because the State is obligated to
equalize public school funding across districts 4 and to fund all public
schools at the floor level set by Proposition 98," the loss of property
tax revenue by school and community college districts creates
obligations for the State's general fund."
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Jerry Brown's Proposal to Abolish California's
Redevelopment Agencies Would Help End Eminent Domain Abuse, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Mar. 26, 2011, 10:24 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/03126/jerry-browns-
proposal-to-abolish-californias-redevelopment-agencies-would-help-end-eminent-domain-
abuse; see also Alyson Tomme, Tax Increment Financing: Public Use or Private Abuse?, 90
MINN. L. REV. 213 (2005).
31. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 33334.2, 33334.3, 33334.6 (West 2012).
32. Id. § 33607.5(a)(2).
33. Id. §H 33680, 33681.7.
34. CAL. ED. CODE § 42238 (West 2012).
35. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 8.
36. George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight That's Right for California Redevelopment
Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 999 (2001) (noting that "where cities and counties shift
property taxes from schools to redevelopment projects, the state must make up the
difference").
Be that as it may, over the last thirty-five years "redevelopment's
share of total statewide property taxes grew six fold."" As of 2012,
California redevelopment agencies received twelve percent of all
property tax revenue in the state.m In short, redevelopment in 2011
bore little resemblance to the small, locally financed program the
Legislature authorized in 1945."
H. The Case
In a decision that is "likely to have major consequences for local
land use authority and development patterns statewide,"' the
California Supreme Court ratified the Legislature's move to do away
with redevelopment as the State knew it. In California
Redevelopment Association v. Matosantos,4' the California Supreme
Court upheld a law that abolished all of the State's redevelopment
42
agencies and struck down a companion statute that would have
allowed the agencies to continue operating if they agreed to make
additional payments to other local agencies.43 This section
contextualizes the case by briefly describing the local finance climate
that sparked the legislation, outlining the legislation that sparked the
litigation, and examining the court's opinions.
A. The Crisis
The Matosantos litigation is largely a story of constitutional and
fiscal conflict between redevelopment agencies and the State itself,
with the disputes often being fought out through amendments to the
California Constitution. In 1910, the California Legislature proposed,
and the voters approved, a constitutional amendment that gave local
governments exclusive control over the property tax.44 With this
37. Mac Taylor, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE POLICY BRIEF, THE 2011-12
BUDGET: SHOULD CALIFORNIA END REDEVELOPMENT AGENCIES? (2011),
http://www.Iao.ca.gov/analysis/2011/realignment/redevelopment_020911.pdf.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Richard Frank, California Supreme Court Upholds Abolition of Local
Redevelopment Agencies, LEGAL PLANET: THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
BLOG (Dec. 29, 2011), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2011/12/29/california-supreme-
court-upholds-abolition-of-state-redevelopment-agencies/.
41. Cal. Redevelopment Ass'n v. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th 231 (2011).
42. A.B. 26, 2011 Assem., 1st Ext. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (upholding CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 34161-34169.5, 34170-34191).
43. A.B. 27, 2011 Assem., 1st Ext. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
44. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, former § 10. (repealed 1974).
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authority, each jurisdiction could levy its own independent property
tax-this meant that a given property owner might be assessed by
their city as well as their county and any special districts within which
their property fell.45
This system of finance had particularly pronounced effects on
public education. Historically, school districts were mostly funded by
portions of local property taxes." Under this model of financing, as it
existed in California through the 1970s, different school districts could
raise very disparate amounts of money based on differences in
property values. That is, where two school districts levied identical
property tax rates but had different average property values, the
district with more valuable property would raise much more money
for its schools. With its expensive real estate, Beverly Hills raised
more money for its schools than Baldwin Park, which had far lower
priced real estate, even though both cities levied similar taxes."
After finding that education is a fundamental interest, the
Supreme Court of California invalidated that system of financing as
violating students' equal protection rights.48 The Serrano decisions
made the relationship of state and local authority over school finance
uncertain.49 Following this decision, a system of financing developed
which pinned principal financial responsibility for schools onto the
State. In order to achieve funding equalization, the ability of
individual school districts to raise revenue was capped and state
contributions were increased."o
California would see another major event for local finance by the
end of the decade. In 1978, the state's voters approved Proposition
13." Officially named the People's Initiative to Limit Property
45. See, e.g., Temescal Water Co. v. Niemann, 22 Cal. App. 174, 176 (Dist. Ct. App.
1913) (noting that "a municipality has the right to assess all real property found within its
limits for the purpose of maintaining the municipal revenues, and that the county taxing
officials have the right to levy upon the same property for county purposes").
46. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano 1), 5 Cal. 3d 584, 592 (1971).
47. Id. at 594.
48. Serrano 1, 5 Cal. 3d at 608 (1971); Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 18 Cal.3d 728,
765 (1976).
49. See Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 181 Cal. App. 4th
414,419 (2010) (quoting City of El Monte v. Comm'n on State Mandates, 83 Cal. App. 4th
266, 278 (2000)) (noting that following the Serrano decisions, "the division of state and
local responsibility for educational funding" was in "a state of flux").
50. See Christopher R. Lockard, Note, In the Wake of Williams v. State: The Past,
Present, and Future of Education Finance Litigation in California, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 385,
388 (2005).
51. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A.
Taxation, Proposition 13 did a number of things. Whereas prior to
1978, cities and counties had the power to levy their own property
taxes, Proposition 13 limited the ad valorem real property taxes that
these entities could impose at one percent.52 This reduced the amount
of revenue that local governments had access to by more than fifty
percent.53 From a taxpayer's perspective, Proposition 13 substituted
multiple taxes imposed by multiple local entities for a single one
percent tax to be collected by the county and apportioned
thereafter." Rather than specifying how that one percent revenue
should be apportioned, Proposition 13 left the determination up to
state law."
Proposition 13 changed the California Constitution in a number
of major ways affecting government finance. First, and perhaps most
obviously, it created a much greater degree of obligation for the State
to fund government services like education. Because local
governments saw their overall revenue drastically cut, they simply
had fewer resources to contribute to meeting mandatory funding
levels for public schools." Additionally, by leaving the method of
allocation up to state law, Proposition 13 transferred control over
local government finances from various local entities to the state; thus
while "nominally imposed by local governments," California's
property tax became a de facto "statewide tax combined with a
complex system of intergovernmental grants."" Lastly, Proposition
13's creation of a low ceiling for a shared property tax made receiving
these revenues an intense zero-sum game: local entities like counties,
cities, and special districts would now compete against each other for
pieces of a comparatively smaller pie.
Proposition 98, which was enacted in 1988, made this competitive
fiscal atmosphere worse by amending the California Constitution to
add minimal funding levels for education and requiring the State to
designate a portion of its General Fund for public schools." Two
years later, with Proposition 111, California voters again amended the
state constitution to effectively increase minimum funding
52. Id. § 1(a).
53. See Kirk J. Stark, The Right to Vote on Taxes, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 191, 198 (2001).
54. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 1(a).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Sasaki, 23 Cal. App. 4th 1442, 1451 (1994).
57. Stark, supra note 53, at 198.
58. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 8.
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requirements for public schools. 9 Because education funding was
continually drawn from the State Treasury, the Legislature created
county educational revenue augmentation funds in 1992.' The
Legislature then reduced the amount of property taxes allocated to
local governments, deposited the difference in ERAFs, called these
balances part of the General Fund in order to satisfy Proposition 98,
and then distributed these funds to school districts.6 This
development meant that the Legislature now had a means to require
redevelopment agencies to make payments to ERAFs as an "exercise
of [the Legislature's] authority to apportion property tax revenues."2
In response to this increase in regulatory power, voters in 2004
passed Proposition 1A to limit the Legislature's authority to
reallocate city, county, and special district property tax shares.63
Proposition 1A did not, however, apply to redevelopment agency
funds.'"
Frustrated by further Legislative actions requiring
redevelopment agencies to make ERAF payments, the voters passed
Proposition 22 in November of 2010." Although the initiative has
many constitutional and statutory implications, the addition of section
25.5(a)(7) to Article XIII of the state constitution is most
consequential for redevelopment agencies. This provision limits what
the state may do with redevelopment agency tax increment revenue
by stating that:
59. See Cnty. of Sonoma v. Comm'n on State Mandates, 84 Cal. App. 4th 1264, 1289
(2000).
60. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 97.2(d)(1), 97.3(2)(a) (West 2012).
61. See Cnty. of Sonoma, 84 Cal. App. 4th at 1275.
62. City of El Monte v. Comm'n on State Mandates, 83 Cal. App. 4th 266,280 (2000)
(citing San Miguel Consol. Fire Protection Dist. v. Davis, 25 Cal. App. 4th 134, 148-49
(1994)).
63. CAL. CONsT. art. XIII, § 25.5(a)(1), (3).
64. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 95(a) (excluding redevelopment agencies from
the definition of "local agency").
65. See generally Los Angeles Daily News, A 'yes' Vote on Prop. 22 Helps Cities, Sept.
10, 2010, http://www.dailynews.com/opinions/ci-16036451 ("[1]awmakers in Sacramento
have for years . . . outright raided billions from cities and redevelopment and transit
agencies.. .Proposition 22 on the Nov. 2 ballot would ... protect local governments and
agencies from these money grabs."); The Bakersfield Californian, Prop. 22 Will Protect
Local Tax Revenue, Sept. 9, 2010, http://www.bakersfieldcalifornian.com/opinion/
editorials/x49333191/Prop-22-will-protect-local-tax-revenue ("The objective of
[Proposition 22] is to prohibit state government from seizing or 'borrowing' funds used for
transportation, redevelopment, or other government services and projects at the local
level.").
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[o]n or after November 3, 2004, the Legislature
shall not enact a statute to... [r]equire a community
redevelopment agency (A) to pay, remit, loan, or
otherwise transfer, directly or indirectly, taxes on ad
valorem real property and tangible personal property
allocated to the agency pursuant to Section 16 of
Article XVI to or for the benefit of the State, any
agency of the State, or any jurisdiction; or (B) to use,
restrict, or assign a particular purpose for such taxes
for the benefit of the State, any agency of the State, or
any jurisdiction.'
Governor Jerry Brown's efforts to solve California's declared
fiscal crisis would reach the Supreme Court of California because of
this seemingly innocuous statute.
B. The Legislation
In June of 2011, the Legislature passed, and the Governor
signed, two measures that were intended to help close California's
projected $25 billion operating deficit. Assembly Bills 26 and 27
consisted of three principal components. Assembly Bill 26, codified
as new parts 1.8 and 1.85 of Division 24 of the Health and Safety
Code, froze and dissolved redevelopment agencies throughout the
state. Assembly Bill 27, codified as new part 1.9 of Division 24 of the
Health and Safety Code, provided a voluntary path by which
redevelopment agencies could continue to exist.
Part 1.8, the freezing component, restricted the activities that
redevelopment agencies could undertake." Although existing
obligations went unaffected,' the agencies were restricted from
issuing new bonds, taking on any new debt, making new plans, or
altering existing plans.' The section also prohibited cities and
counties from creating new redevelopment agencies.!o Part 1.8's
overall purpose was to save redevelopment agencies' revenues and
assets so that they could be used by local governments to fund
traditional services like police, fire protection, and schools. 7'
66. CAL. CONST. art. XIII § 25.5(a)(7).
67. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 34161-34169.5 (West 2012).
68. Id. § 34169.
69. Id. §§ 34162-34165.
70. Id. § 34166.
71. Id. § 34167(a).
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Part 1.85, the dissolution component, eradicated all of the State's
redevelopment agencies' and transferred the agencies' assets to local
successor agencies which have tended to be the city or county that
created the redevelopment agency." Importantly, this section
requires that balances not committed to paying down preexisting debt
be transferred to the county auditor-controller, for distribution to
cities and other special districts in proportion to whatever they would
have received without the redevelopment agencies.7 Any proceeds
created by the sale of redevelopment agency assets like physical
property must also go to the county auditor-controller."
Additionally, this section required that any additional tax increment
revenues that would have gone to the redevelopment agencies be put
76into a local trust fund that each county creates and maintains.
Part 1.9, the only part of A.B. 27, offered redevelopment
agencies an escape hatch. It offered parent cities and counties an
exemption from the freezing and dissolution provisions so long as
they agreed to make specified payments from their redevelopment
agencies to both the county ERAF and a new special district
augmentation fund." Any county or city that passed an ordinance to
that effect would have been able to maintain their redevelopment
agency as it operated under the Community Redevelopment Law.
Although the law required that biannual payments be made by cities
and counties, each parent government may contract with its
redevelopment agency so that the payments come out of the agency's
tax increment revenue. Any lapse in payment would have resulted
in the dissolution of the redevelopment agency.'
C. The Opinions
In what was termed a "shocking display of fiscal fortitude,"" the
California Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Legislature's
72. Id. § 34172(a)(1).
73. Id. §§ 34171(), 34173, 34175(b).
74. Id. §§ 34177(d), 34183(a)(4), 34188.
75. Id. § 34177(e).
76. Id. § 34170.5(b).
77. Id. §§ 34192-34196.
78. Id. § 34193(a).
79. Id. § 34194.2.
80. Id. § 34195.
81. Steven Greenhut, California's Shocking Show of Fiscal Fortitude, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-24/california-displays-some-
fiscal-fortitude-commentary-by-steven-greenhut.html.
authority to freeze the activity of and thereafter dissolve all of the
State's redevelopment agencies." However the court struck down, by
a six to one margin, the Legislature's companion statute that would
have allowed redevelopment agencies to escape dissolution as long as
their parent municipalities agreed to make payments to certain local
entities."3 Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye dissented from the
majority's invalidation of this companion statute."
First, the court noted that it invokes its original jurisdiction
"where the matters to be decided are of sufficiently great importance
and require immediate resolution."" The court found the case to
present exactly those circumstances: it saw that the bills "place the
[S]tate's nearly 400 redevelopment agencies under threat of imminent
dissolution, while the Association's petition calls into question the
proper allocation of billions of dollars in property tax revenue."" The
court might have also added that the dispute raised fundamental
questions regarding the balance of power the state constitution
establishes between the state and its local governments.
The court began its analysis of the merits by emphasizing an
important rule of state constitutional construction: the state
legislature's authority is plenary, and any doubt as to whether the
Legislature has the authority to act should be resolved in favor of the
Legislature's action." The court first applied this rule of
constitutional construction to Part 1.85, A.B. 26's dissolution
component." It did this by affirming the Legislature's authority to
exercise "any and all legislative powers which are not expressly or by
necessary implication denied to it by the Constitution."" In other
words, courts do not look to the state constitution for specific
authorization when reviewing the legitimacy of legislative action;
rather, they look for specific prohibition. From that premise, the
court asserts a corollary power of the Legislature to abrogate existing
laws, noting "[w]hat the Legislature has enacted, it may repeal."'
82. Cal. Redevelopment Ass'n v. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th 231 (2011).
83. Id. at 264.
84. Id. at 276.
85. Id. at 253.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 254.
89. Id. (citing Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Saylor, 5 Cal. 3d 685 (1971)).
90. Id. at 255 (citing People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 518 (1996)).
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The court then applied this principle to sub-state political
entities. Barring some specific constitutional obstacle, the state
remains sovereign and any cities and counties within the state are
mere creatures of the state that only exist at the state's will." Using
similar logic, because they are political subdivisions of the state,
redevelopment agencies are also subjects of the Legislature's will.
The court notes that this has been true in theory as well as in practice:
the Legislature has statutorily altered the scope of redevelopment
agencies' rights on a number of occasions. 2 It struck the court as
particularly significant that the Legislature has mandated that
redevelopment plans that receive tax increment funds have finite
durations."
The Association's first constitutional claim was that the
dissolution component violates Article XVI, section 16 of the
California Constitution.94 That portion of the California Constitution
states "[t]he Legislature may provide that any redevelopment plan
may contain a provision that the taxes, if any ... shall be divided" in
certain ways." It also provides that the "Legislature shall enact those
laws as may be necessary to enforce the provisions" of that section."
This provision was added to the California Constitution by initiative
in 1952 to expressly establish the Legislature's authority to authorize
property tax increment financing for redevelopment agency projects.
The court found that nothing in the amendment's text or legislative
history creates an absolute right for redevelopment agencies to exist
in perpetuity. The court succinctly summed up its rationale on this
point by stating that Article XVI, section 16 does not "grant a
constitutional right to continue to receive tax increment for as long as
redevelopment agencies have debt."97 Rather, it merely "authorizes
the Legislature to statutorily grant redevelopment agencies rights to
tax increment up to the amount of their total indebtedness."98 The
court concluded that Article XVI, section 16 of the California
91. Id. (quoting Board of Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n, 3 Cal.
4th 903 (1992)).
92. Id. at 256.
93. Id. at 256 (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33333.2).
94. Id. at 256.
95. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 16 (emphasis added).
96. Id.
97. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th at 258.
98. Id.
Constitution does not create an absolute right for redevelopment
agencies to continue to exist."
The Association's alternate, and potentially more significant,
constitutional argument was that the dissolution provision violates
Article XIII § 25.5 (a)(7) of the California Constitution.'"0 That
section, which was added to the state constitution by Proposition 22 in
2010, generally prohibits the Legislature from forcing a
redevelopment agency to transfer its tax increment revenue to the
State or to otherwise restrict or assign such taxes for the State's
benefit.o' Perhaps most significantly, that section prohibits the
Legislature from requiring community redevelopment agencies to
"pay, remit, loan, or otherwise transfer, directly or indirectly, taxes on
ad valorem real property and tangible personal property allocated to
the agency pursuant to section 16 of Article XVI."" The Association
argued that A.B. 26's dissolution of redevelopment agencies
constituted an unconstitutional transfer of the tax increment revenues
that Proposition 22 was designed to protect.
The court disagreed on a number of grounds. It began by
observing the facial implausibility of the notion that Proposition 22
constitutionalized the existence of redevelopment agencies, which are
mere special districts.03 To do so "would represent a profound
change in the structure of state government" by requiring local
governments to create redevelopment agencies without receiving
constitutional protection for their own existence as municipalities."
The court found that Proposition 22's text lacks language that
supports the constitutionalization of redevelopment agencies and that
it would be improper for the court to work such a broad change in
local government law by reaching that conclusion based on an
inference. 0s
The court also invoked the inclusio unius est exclusio alterius
canon of statutory interpretation in justifying its conclusion.'" This
canon means that the expression of one thing signifies the exclusion
99. Id. at 259-60.
100. Id. at 260.
101. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 25.5(a)(7).
102. Id.
103. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th at 260.
104. Id. at 260-61.
105. Id. at 261.
106. Id.
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of others."o' While Proposition 22 expressly added certain limits to
the Legislature's statutory powers, the amendment did not expressly
revoke the Legislature's power to determine whether redevelopment
agencies should exist at all. Furthermore, if those who drafted and
proposed the initiative intended to constitutionalize the existence of
redevelopment agencies, that intention would likely have been made
clear in the various supporting and opposing ballot arguments.
Rather, the court found "silence."',o
Having found that the Legislature does have the authority to
dissolve redevelopment agencies, the court turned to the question of
whether the Legislature may freeze redevelopment activity as it did in
Part 1.8 of A.B. 26. The court reiterated its conclusion that
Proposition 22 is best read to limit the Legislature's powers over
redevelopment agencies while they are in operation, not while the
Legislature seeks to dissolve them altogether." The court found that
the Legislature had determined that tax increment revenue should no
longer be allocated to redevelopment agencies and that the agencies
should no longer be able to take on new debt. This, according to the
court, constituted a valid exercise of the Legislature's constitutional
power "to authorize property tax increment revenue for, or to
withdraw that authorization from, redevelopment agencies.""o For
largely the same reasons that it cited in upholding the dissolution
provision, the court concluded that, "Proposition 22 does not
invalidate the freeze portions of [the bill] as they apply to dissolving
redevelopment agencies."n
Having upheld the Legislature's dissolution and freeze provisions
in A.B. 26, the court next considered the constitutionality of A.B. 27.
As mentioned above, this statute offered cities and counties that
wished to keep their redevelopment agencies the option to do so as
long as they made regularized payments."' While the court had found
that Proposition 22 did not invalidate A.B. 26, it found that
Proposition 22 did preclude the Legislature from requiring the
payments that A.B. 27 contemplated. In other words, the court found
that the escape hatch that the Legislature set up for redevelopment
agencies exceeded the Legislature's authority as proscribed by
107. See United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 357 (1988).
108. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th at 261.
109. Id. at 263.
110. Id. at 261.
111. Id. at 264.
112. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 34193(a), 34193.2(a) (West 2011).
Proposition 22."' The court found that A.B. 27's continuation
payments benefited the State and its jurisdictions by replacing
funding that the State would otherwise have to provide under
Proposition 98 and therefore, the payments fell within the transfer of
funds Proposition 22 prohibited.114 The court concluded that A.B. 27
was facially invalid "in its entirety" and that A.B. 26 could be severed
and enforced independently."'
To summarize, the court found that pursuant to the Legislature's
plenary authority to create and eliminate local governments, the
Legislature could authorize the creation of redevelopment agencies."
While the California Constitution allows the Legislature to authorize
redevelopment agencies to receive tax increment funds, the agencies
have no constitutional right to receive those funds."' But, if the
Legislature allows for the establishment of redevelopment agencies
and enables them to receive tax increment funds, it may not
thereafter require that those tax increment revenues be handed over
for the benefit of the state or any of its subdivisions 18
While the court's conclusion that the Legislature has the
authority to freeze and dissolve the State's redevelopment agencies
was unanimous, its conclusion that the Legislature could not
condition the agencies' continued existence upon regular payments to
local entities was not. Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye dissented from
the majority's opinion on A.B. 27 because she felt that the
Association had not discharged its burden of showing that community
sponsors would use funds that were protected by Proposition 22."'
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye found that "the majority's conclusion
rests on an impermissibly broad reading of Proposition 22 plain
language, on unsupported assumptions concerning the intent behind
Proposition 22, and on speculation that constitutional problems could
result from the implementation of Assembly Bill 1X 27.",120
In interpreting Proposition 22, Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye
argued that the text only prohibits payments made by redevelopment
agencies-not payments that could, in theory, be made by the
113. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th at 264.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 270.
116. Id, at 274.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 277 (Cantil-Sakauye, C.J., dissenting).
120. Id.
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successor agencies that A.B. 27 designates.12' Although the statute
does allow these successor community agencies to contract with
redevelopment agencies in order to make the regularized payments,
the Chief Justice notes that nothing in the law requires that this occur.
Clearly, she found A.B. 27's ambivalence on the source of the
payments to be of crucial constitutional significance.
Rather than finding Article XIII, section 25.5 of the California
Constitution ambiguous in its wording, as the majority did, the Chief
Justice found that Proposition 22's plain language does not prohibit
the kind of payments that A.B. 27 prescribes. 22 She argues that the
payments go to community sponsors rather than redevelopment
agencies and that Proposition 22 does not contemplate the shifting of
funds from community sponsors to other local entities.123 The Chief
Justice then countered the majority's use of the canons of statutory
interpretation by invoking her own: She argued that when statutes
contain lists of items, courts should determine the meaning of each
item by reference to the others. Preference should be given to an
interpretation that treats items similar in nature and scope the same.
The rule, "that a word is known by the company it keeps,"' led the
Chief Justice to conclude that if Proposition 22 had meant to prevent
the Legislature from using tax increment revenue as a yardstick for
determining payments, it would have been written in a way that made
that intent obvious. Because that is not the case, the text of the
Proposition should not be deemed ambiguous and therefore does not
deserve a liberal construction.
The Chief Justice then went on to argue that even under a liberal
construction of Proposition 22's text, A.B. 27 should not be rendered
unconstitutional. The Chief Justice's discussion of the history of
Proposition 22 is of particular relevance here. She argues that
nothing in the constitutional amendment's text or history supports
expanding it beyond its literal wording so as to "shield tax increment
funds from being used as a mere yardstick" for measuring ERAF
payments.126
The Chief Justice also objects to the notion that the history of
Proposition 22 suggests an intention that all conceivable local
121. Id. at 282.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 282-83.
125. Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961).
126. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th at 290 (Cantil-Sakauye, C.J., dissenting).
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government revenues should be protected. Indeed, if this turns out to
be what the majority means when it interprets Proposition 22's
constitutional amendment, most of the alternatives that local
governments have following this litigation will evaporate. Rather, in
light of the specificity with which the drafters of Proposition 22
crafted the amendment, the Chief Justice thought it "far more
reasonable to conclude that Proposition 22 was narrowly intended to
protect specific local government revenues" instead of all funds
legally available for satisfying A.B. 27.127
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye concluded her dissent by noting
that the payments prescribed by the statute were not even
inconsistent with Proposition 22's broader intent to prevent the
Legislature from raiding revenues dedicated to funding vital local
government services.128 In fact, the payments for the statutory scheme
seemed to benefit those very services that Proposition 22 sought to
protect. The payment statutes provided that, for example, payments
would be made to fire, transit, and school districts within the
redevelopment project area.129 Payments were also to be made to
fund schools within the redevelopment project area over and above
the State's contributions to the district. This would potentially result
in "more funding for schools in financially troubled areas."l 30
IH. The Road Ahead: What is Constitutionally Permissible?
The biggest surprise surrounding the Matosantos decision is that
the court decided to strike down the provision that would have
allowed municipalities to maintain their redevelopment agencies after
upholding the dissolution statute. This presented the State with a
situation that the Legislature had not provided for: All of its
redevelopment agencies were dissolved, but their parent
municipalities were stripped of the ability to choose to keep them.
That this state of affairs was unintended was made evident by the fact
that Governor Brown had previously proposed completely
eliminating redevelopment agencies."' Rather than taking this route,
the Legislature and Governor Brown agreed upon a compromise
127. Id. at 292.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 250 (majority opinion).
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strategy that included A.B. 27, which allowed municipalities to pay to
keep their redevelopment agencies."'
Although Governor Brown has not clearly indicated
dissatisfaction with the outcome of the Matosantos litigation, the
Legislature took immediate action to attempt to mitigate the effects
of the court's decision. As of February 24, 2012, which was the
deadline for bill introduction at the California Legislature, a number
of bills had been introduced that contained technical modifications to
A.B. 26."' But beyond technical fixes, any legislative effort to revive
some form of redevelopment authority will have to overcome the
hurdle that caused the court to strike down A.B. 27. That is, the
Legislature will have to find a way to fund redevelopment without
running afoul of Matosantos' interpretation of the California
Constitution.
But before the Legislature acts in any comprehensive way, local
governments might turn to some underused tools that they already
possess in order to finance local improvements. Infrastructure
financing districts have been around for over twenty years, but have
gotten little usage because of the previous ease with which tax
increment-funded redevelopment agencies could raise money and
initiate projects. Infrastructure financing districts were authorized by
the California Legislature largely because the Legislature had
determined that "the state and federal governments [had]
withdrawn ... from their former role in financing major, regional, or
communitywide infrastructure" projects." These financing districts
were conceived as an alternative method of funding local
infrastructure projects. Because they tend to be more difficult to
establish than the traditional redevelopment agency, municipalities
have not had much reason to utilize them. Like redevelopment
agencies, infrastructure financing districts use property tax increment
to finance public projects."' Currently, infrastructure finance districts
may divert property tax increment revenues from other local districts,
excluding school districts."' The law also allows infrastructure
132. Id.
133. CAL. REDEv ASS'N, LEGISLATION INTRODUCED TO CARRY AB lX 26 FIXES
(Sept. 26, 2012, 7:16 PM), http://www.calredevelop.org/External/WCPages/WCWeb
Content/WebContentPage.aspx?ContentlD=1962.
134. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53395(a) (West 2006).
135. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 53395.2 (West 2006).
136. See SENATE RULES COMM., Bill Analysis of SB 214 (Sept. 26, 2012, 7:20 PM),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0201-0250/sb 214_cfa_20110909-113744
sen-floor.html.
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finance districts to issue debt, much like redevelopment agencies were
able to do, through bonds." Although current law requires voter
approval before an infrastructure finance district can be established,
the State Legislature has already considered legislation that would
eliminate the requirement of voter approval to create the districts.'
Although this financing method would allow localities to
continue funding projects in a similar way that redevelopment
agencies did, infrastructure financing districts lack two powers that
made redevelopment agencies controversial. First, infrastructure
financing districts cannot receive tax increment funds that would
otherwise go to school districts."9 This gives infrastructure financing
districts access to fewer funds, but is likely to make them more
attractive to communities in the wake of Matosantos. Second,
infrastructure financing districts are not granted the power of eminent
domain. This is part of what makes them less visible than
redevelopment agencies-a routine criticism of California
redevelopment in particular was that redevelopment agencies abused
their eminent domain power by taking public property for nonpublic
uses.
Other opportunities for financing redevelopment projects
include forging quasi-private partnerships with firms willing to
provide capital to meet public sector demands for projects and
services. Ideally, public entities would contract for private capital in
order to take advantage of both entities' expertise and authority. In
the absence of other state and federal regulatory issues, this is
another way for municipalities to fund local improvements while
avoiding the pitfall that Proposition 22 has turned out to be.
The Matosantos Court's affirmation of the State's plenary
authority over its municipalities may also offer the State a chance to
more broadly redefine the state-local relationship with respect to
local economic development. In particular, the court's decision to
strike down A.B. 27 could be taken as a lesson in controlling local
funding. As discussed above, the court's decision to strike A.B. 27
down created a worst-of-all-worlds situation for redevelopment
agencies-they would be dissolved and there was nothing they could
do about it. If constraints on local funding like Proposition 22 were
relaxed, cities and counties might be able to take on greater
responsibility for the costs of their redevelopment projects. This
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53395.1 (West 2006).
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would give municipalities greater incentives to undertake only those
projects that are most likely to be successful and that have strong
community support.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court of California's Matosantos decision
interpreted the California Constitution to reaffirm the view that
municipal governments are mere agents of the state. This view of
local government's place in the constitutional structure has persisted
for at least a century,"O and the court recognized the upheaval that a
decision effectively constitutionalizing special districts would cause.
In connection with that power structure, the Matosantos decision
may also be seen as another reminder of the trouble that frequent
constitutional amendment can lead to. The California Constitution
appears to have done everything but guarantee that redevelopment
agencies exist in perpetuity: By protecting their funds over and over
again, successive constitutional amendments paved the way for
disputes like the Matosantos litigation.
However redevelopment occurs in California following
Matosantos, one thing is clear: Absent a crystal-clear constitutional
directive to the contrary, the State retains its plenary authority to
work paradigm shifts in the local landscape should it be necessary. It
remains to be seen whether new forms of redevelopment will grow
under conditions as uncertain as these. In any case, the time is ripe in
California for new and innovative ideas for financing local economic
development that do not run afoul of the State's comprehensive
constitution.
140. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907) (noting that "the
State is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitution,
may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States").
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